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Abstract
In this paper, we develop and illustrate a prototype incentive system for promoting rapid reduction of forest clearing 
in tropical countries. Our proposed Tropical Forest Protection Fund (TFPF) is a cash-on-delivery system that rewards 
independently monitored performance without formal contracts. The system responds to forest tenure problems in 
many countries by dividing incentive payments between national governments, which command the greatest number of 
instruments that affect forest clearing, and indigenous communities, which often have tenure rights in forested lands. 
The TFPF incorporates both monetary and reputational incentives, which are calculated quarterly. The monetary 
incentives are unconditional cash transfers based on measured performance, while the reputational incentives are 
publicly disclosed, color-coded performance ratings for each country. The incentives include rewards for: (1) exceeding 
long-run expectations, given a country’s forest clearing history and development status; (2) meeting or exceeding 
global REDD+ goals; and (3) achieving an immediate reduction in forest clearing. Drawing on monthly forest clearing 
indicators from the new FORMA (Forest Monitoring for Action) database, we illustrate a prototype TFPF for eight 
East Asian countries: Cambodia, China, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Myanmar, Thailand, and Vietnam. A system 
with identical design principles could be implemented by single or multiple donors for individual or multiple forest 
proprietors within one or more countries, as well as national or local governments in individual countries, tropical 
regions, or the global pan-tropics. Our results demonstrate the importance of financial flexibility in the design of the 
proposed TFPF. Its incentives are calculated to induce a massive, rapid reduction of tropical forest clearing. If that 
occurs, a TFPF for East Asia will need standby authority for disbursements that may total $10–14 billion annually for the 
next two decades. This financial burden will not persist, however, because the TFPF is designed to self-liquidate once all 
recipient countries have achieved clearly specified benchmarks. We estimate that the TFPF can be closed by 2070, with 
its major financial responsibility discharged by 2040.
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In this paper, we propose using the latest forest monitoring technology to promote tropical 
forest conservation in an incentive-based system called the Tropical Forest Protection Fund 
(TFPF). Our proposed system fulfills the central mission of REDD+ (Reducing Emissions 
from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries), which is to promote 
conservation by rewarding governments that choose to protect their forested lands. 
However, the TFPF is unlike other REDD+ programs because its architecture is driven by 
the conviction that we’re out of time: Damaging climate change and rapid sea level rise are 
already upon us (Wheeler, 2011). The next decade will determine whether we can roll back 
these threats before they become overwhelming. Urgency requires us to move rapidly in the 
world as it is, not as we might like it to be. To stop forest clearing, we must find a way to 
make REDD+ work in the Myanmars as well as the Indonesias. If we focus only on 
countries that are “comfortable” for conventional assistance, gains achieved there may well 
be lost as forest clearing shifts to other venues.  
Success requires that we rapidly engage all tropical forest countries with a consistently-
implemented global system that offers compelling incentives to conserve forests. This can 
only work if we minimize process complexity, avoid negotiation of myriad bilateral and 
multilateral agreements, and provide maximum flexibility for responding to the incentives 
that are offered. At the same time, we must respect the claims of indigenous communities 
whose stewardship will be critical for forest conservation. These communities are 
demanding direct access to REDD+ resources, because they do not believe that they will 
receive just shares of incentive payments that are given to national governments. Our 
proposed program accommodates that demand. 
A global incentive program can only work if it draws on rapidly-updated information about 
forest clearing that is not dependent on the institutional strength, good will, or commitment 
to transparency of payment recipients who may have none of these traits. Fortunately, such 
independent information resources can now be harnessed on a global scale.  
Our proposed architecture may surprise, and quite possibly unsettle, some colleagues who 
have worked tirelessly to protect forests by more traditional means. We are committed to 
reaching the same goal, albeit by an unconventional route that we believe offers more hope 
of success before the Earth moves to a hot state that will be catastrophic for everyone.  
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2. Introduction  
REDD+ programs aim to conserve forests by offering incentives to reduce forest clearing. 
Although the basic concept seems clear, international negotiators have been slow to adopt 
specific measures. For example, the Cancun agreement (UNFCCC, 2011) goes no further 
than invocation of the need for performance benchmarks, conservation targets, national 
action plans and development of implementing institutions.1 In truth, negotiators may feel 
little pressure to get more specific until a multilateral fund is chartered to dispense the 
billions of dollars that have been promised by donor countries.2 The design of such a Green 
Climate Fund was discussed at the April UNFCCC meeting in Bangkok (Reuters, 2011).  
While multilateral negotiations continue, Norway is providing bilateral leadership in pilot 
REDD+ programs with the governments of Guyana and Indonesia. The agreement with 
Guyana allows for as much as $250 million in total incentive payments by 2015, with $7.3 
million payable in each year that Guyana clears less than 10,000 hectares of forested land 
(Development Today, 2011). Norway initiated the agreement in 2009 by depositing $30 
million in the Guyana REDD+ Investment Fund (GRIF), which is administered by the 
World Bank. Recently it has deposited an additional $40 million, citing evidence that Guyana 
has maintained a lower deforestation rate than previously anticipated (Forbes, 2011). 
However, numerous critics have noted that the initial $30 million predated any performance 
assessment; that subsequent deforestation significantly increased; and that, in any case, no 
independent means of verification exist (Lang, 2011). Norway has recently relaxed the 
annual 10,000-hectare limit by exempting 4,500 forested hectares that Guyana will clear to 
build a dam, whose financing will draw on Norway’s REDD+ payment. 
In the Indonesia program, Norway has committed to disbursing up to $US 1 billion during 
the next 7-8 years, with phase 1 supporting strategy development, policy reform and 
institutional development; phase 2 financing a pilot program in Central Kalimantan 
province; and phase 3 paying for verified emissions reductions countrywide (Government of 
Norway, 2010; Rondonuwu and Fogarty, 2010). Phase 2 of the program has just begun, so 
any assessment would be premature. 
In summary, implementation of REDD+ programs has just begun, and serious questions 
remain about the design of appropriate, verifiable performance incentive mechanisms. This 
paper attempts to contribute with a design that reflects the basic principles of cash on 
delivery (COD) aid specified by Birdsall and Savedoff (2010): 
                                                       
1  See particularly Part C, starting on p. 12.  The general tenor is captured by the agreement’s statement that 
governments should "collectively aim to slow, halt and reverse forest cover and carbon loss, according to national 
circumstances.". 
2 The Cancun accord notes that developed countries have promised $30 billion in "fast start" funding for 
2010-2012, the first step toward providing $100 billion per year from 2020, as agreed at the Copenhagen climate 
summit in 2009.     
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COD Aid is a funding mechanism that hinges on results. At its core is a contract between funders and 
recipients that stipulates a fixed payment for each unit of confirmed progress toward an agreed-upon goal. 
Once the contract is struck, the funder takes a hands-off approach, allowing the recipient the freedom and 
responsibility to achieve the goal on its own. Payment is made only after progress toward the goal is 
independently verified by a third party.  
In that spirit, our proposed approach establishes measurable performance benchmarks; 
specifies fixed rewards per unit of achievement (judged by the benchmarks); independently 
audits performance; and delivers rewards automatically. It also reflects COD aid principles in 
setting no preconditions for planning, institutional development or policy reform. However, 
our approach goes further in one respect, because it does not involve a performance 
contract between donor and recipient. It simply performs public performance audits for all 
parties assessed, assigns rewards accordingly, and makes them available to deserving parties 
without other conditions. Countries can pursue forest conservation as they see fit, knowing 
in advance that their rewards will be proportionate to their publicly-measured progress 
against clear benchmarks.  
In this paper, we develop and illustrate a prototype system for eight East Asian countries: 
Cambodia, China, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam. The 
system relies on frequently-updated, independently-acquired information on forest clearing, 
as exemplified by FORMA (Forest Monitoring for Action), which processes data from 
NASA’s MODIS system to provide monthly forest-clearing information for the pan-tropics 
at 1 km spatial resolution (Hammer, Kraft and Wheeler, 2009, 2011). We provide a more 
detailed introduction to FORMA in Appendix A4.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3 describes our benchmarking 
principles and rules for assigning payments and public performance ratings. We develop the 
economics of our proposed incentive payments in Section 4, while Section 5 focuses on the 
recipients. Section 6 introduces our proposed Tropical Forest Protection Fund, and Section 
7 develops the illustrative prototype for the eight East Asian countries. Section 8 explores 
alternative futures for the TFPF and their implications for financing, and Section 9 
summarizes and concludes the paper.  
3. Setting the Ground Rules  
3.1. Initial Conditions  
A performance incentive system requires establishment of a benchmark against which 
progress can be judged. In REDD+ programs, for example, the benchmark is often forest 
clearing in the period preceding implementation. This implicitly assumes a “fair game”, in 
which previous conditions were neither abnormally favorable nor unfavorable for forest 
clearing. Failure to satisfy this condition would make subsequently-measured progress either  
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“too easy” (if prior conditions promoted unusually rapid clearing, which would subsequently 
have declined regardless) or “too hard” (in the converse case). In reality, “fair game” may be 
an elusive concept because forest clearing can be driven by so many factors: population size 
and density, travel time to markets, the quality of transport infrastructure, agricultural input 
prices, product prices, interest rates, exchange rates, physical factors such as topography, 
precipitation and soil quality, and the status of protected areas.3 Their significance 
undoubtedly varies from place to place, and in each locale different factors might well be 
judged favorable or unfavorable for clearing in any particular period. In practice, the only 
realistic benchmark is probably average forest clearing during a previous period long enough 
to dampen the effects of short-run fluctuations in potentially-important drivers such as 
seasonal rainfall, product prices, exchange rates and interest rates. For this exercise, we use 
average clearing during the previous two years as the benchmark.  
3.2. Benchmarking the Forest Transition  
Once the initial benchmark is set, performance incentives can be related to the difference 
between the benchmark and actual clearing in each subsequent period. However, the 
benchmark should not be viewed as a fixed standard. It should also incorporate the normal 
“forest transition” that accompanies economic development, in which forest clearing gives 
way to regeneration as conservation values and forest management capability increase. In 
earlier work, Cropper and Griffiths (1994) found an inverse U-shaped forest transition curve 
that reached peak deforestation between per capita incomes of $US 7,000 and 16,000.4 Our 
own econometric results for the period 1990-2010, reported in Appendix A1, indicate that 
the relationship is now monotone-declining, with the forest transition line reaching zero net 
deforestation at a GDP per capita of $10,150.5  
Incorporating the forest transition changes a country’s performance benchmark from a fixed 
value to a target path that declines toward zero clearing at an income of $10,150. It also 
affects the initial benchmark value, which should account for a country’s relative 
                                                       
3 Nelson and Chomitz (2009), Chomitz, et al. (2006) Rudel, et al. (2009), Wunder and Verbist (2003) and 
Barbier (2000) have studied cross-country determinants of forest clearing over multi-year intervals.  Within 
counties, numerous econometric studies have estimated the impact of drivers across local areas during multi-year 
intervals. Some studies have used aggregate data for states, provinces or sub-provinces (e.g. studies for Brazilian 
municipios by Pfaff (1997) and Igliori (2006), and Mexican states by Barbier and Burgess (1996)).  Many studies 
have also used GIS-based techniques to obtain estimates at a higher level of spatial disaggregation (e.g., Chomitz 
and Thomas (2003) for Brazil; Cropper, et. al. (1999, 2001) for Thailand; Agwaral, et al. (2002) for Madagascar; 
Deininger and Minton (1999, 2002), Chowdhury (2006) and Vance and Geoghegan (2002) for Mexico; 
Kaimowitz, et al. (2002) for Bolivia; and De Pinto and Nelson (2009) for Panama).  In rarer cases, studies have 
used annual national or regional aggregate time series over extended periods (e.g. Zikri (2009) for Indonesia; 
Cattaneo (2001) and Ewers, et al. (2008) for Brazil). 
4 We have adjusted the Cropper/Griffith estimates to $US 2010 using the US GDP deflator.  Variations in 
peak deforestation are attributable to differences in population density. 
5 We measure GDP per capita at purchasing power parity, in constant $US 2005.  Our data are drawn from 
IMF (2011).  
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performance in the years prior to the program. We determine initial benchmarks in a process 
designed to increase performance rewards for countries whose past performance has been 
better than average. First, we use the estimated global forest transition line (reported in 
Table A1), to calculate each country’s predicted deforestation rate during the period 2000-
2005. Then we divide the predicted rate by the actual rate, creating an index of the country’s 
prior performance relative to the global norm. We retain index values greater than one and 
set the rest at one. We multiply this index by initial forest clearing to set the initial point for 
the forest transition line. The terminal point is zero for an income of $10,150, as we 
previously noted. 
In each period, a country whose forest clearing path is below its transition path receives a 
performance incentive proportional to the distance between the paths. To clarify, suppose 
that a country achieves a 10-unit decrease below the initial benchmark in the first year. In 
that year, its payment is 10 times the unit payment offered by the system. Now suppose that 
in the second year, clearing remains constant at the reduced level but the transition 
benchmark falls by one unit as the economy grows toward $10,150 per capita. The country 
continues to receive rewards for 9 of the 10 unit reductions it achieved in the first year, 
because those 9 units represent carbon that has remained sequestered in the forest rather 
than emitted into the atmosphere. Further suppose that clearing remains at the same level as 
the economy continues to grow, with the transition benchmark dropping 1 unit each year. 
The units rewarded will fall in step, from 8 in the third year to 0 in the 11th year, and total 
units rewarded during the 11 years will be 55 [10 + 9 + … + 1]. By identical reasoning, the 
country will have a total of 100 units rewarded if it continues to reduce clearing by 1 unit 
each year (as the benchmark also falls by one unit).  
3.3. Incorporating REDD+ Concerns  
REDD+ has emerged from a sense of crisis surrounding global carbon emissions. We have 
little chance of avoiding a climate catastrophe unless the carbon intensity of economic 
activity plummets in the near future. But this will not happen fast enough under “business as 
usual,” which includes the normal evolution captured by our estimated forest transition line. 
To incorporate REDD+ concerns, we introduce a second path that declines from the initial 
benchmark for each country to zero in a common target year for all countries. No consensus 
target year has emerged from international negotiations, although drafts circulated at Cancun 
apparently included references to a target date of 2030 (Gray, 2010). We would prefer a 
more ambitious target, because our proposed system is based entirely on incentives, not 
binding conditions. For our prototype exercise, we set a REDD path that declines from each 
country’s initial benchmark point to zero in 2025. Countries whose forest clearing paths are 
below their REDD paths receive additional payments proportional to the distance between 
the two paths. The associated calculations are identical to those illustrated in the previous 
section.   
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3.4. Rewarding Short-Run Improvements  
Once the proposed program begins, a variety of factors could propel some countries well 
beyond their initial clearing levels. Such factors could include price spikes for forest 
products, or flouting of weakly-enforced regulations by local firms. Once these countries 
have strayed too far above the forest transition and REDD lines, the eventual rewards from 
course reversal might appear too distant to warrant the fixed cost of the transition. But 
resetting the benchmarks for recalcitrant countries could be fatal for the entire system, since 
it would create perverse incentives for other countries to expand forest clearing, with the 
expectation of new benchmarks and greater rewards for reducing deforestation in the future. 
We address this problem by introducing a proportionate reward for decreased clearing from 
one period to the next. The reward lasts for only one period, and is given only once for a 
decrease in a particular range. This avoids perpetuation of periodic, identical rewards for a 
country whose clearing cycles around a flat line. It also avoids perverse incentives, by setting 
short-term rewards that are significant enough to interest recalcitrants, but substantially 
lower than the rewards to be gained on a path that remains below the transition and REDD 
lines.  
To summarize, our prototype system rewards performance relative to three benchmarks: a 
declining forest transition line; a declining REDD target line; and last period’s performance. 
A country that stays on a declining path below both lines will get all three rewards in each 
period, while a country that continually increases forest clearing will get no rewards in any 
period. An intermediate performance will earn an intermediate reward. 
4. The Economics of Performance Payments  
Our proposed system incorporates the basic principle of cash-on-delivery (COD) aid by 
rewarding each unit of performance that exceeds a benchmark. Its architecture anticipates 
rapid expansion to global provision of compelling rewards for forest conservation, in a non-
contractual system whose rules are simple to administer, easy to understand and uniformly 
applied for all countries. In contrast, much discussion of REDD+ has focused on country-
specific agreements whose payment schemes incorporate the economic opportunity costs of 
local forested lands. In our view, both theoretical considerations (Arcanda et al., 2008; 
Cattaneo, 2001; San et al., 2000; Wunder and Verbist, 2003.) and empirical research 
(Blankespoor et al., 2011) suggest that such schemes will often prove intractable, because 
local opportunity costs will fluctuate rapidly and widely in response to movements in key 
drivers such as plantation product prices, exchange rates and interest rates (Blankespoor, et 
al., 2011). Even if local opportunity costs were easy to compute, which is not the case, this 
instability would make it very difficult to establish sustainable agreements with recipient 
governments. In any case, a rapidly-implemented global system of the type we envision 
cannot achieve its goals through such a ponderous process.   
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4.1. Pricing CO2  
In contrast, our approach adopts a globally-uniform “offer” price for forest conservation 
wherever it occurs. This approach imposes three conditions on the price. First, it must 
remain stable for a substantial period, so that potential recipients will gain confidence in the 
offer and the potential reward for reduced forest clearing. Second, it must be high enough to 
offer credible compensation for conservation, even in areas where the conversion 
opportunity cost is relatively high. Third, it should not be higher than the marginal cost of 
CO2 reduction in the energy sector, which is the effective unit price at which energy 
producers can be induced to reduce CO2 emissions. This provides a natural competitive 
standard for the forest sector, because failure to halt forest clearing at this price would be a 
clear signal to reallocate scarce mitigation resources to the energy sector, whose contribution 
to global CO2 emissions is at least twice that of the forest sector (WRI, 2011).  
Table 1 provides evidence from recent research on conversion opportunity costs in tropical 
forests, translated from the economic opportunity value of specific land parcels to the offer 
price for sequestered CO2 that would make conservation an equally-profitable activity (RFF, 
2011). These results include interior areas far removed from the current deforestation 
frontier, as well as areas at the clearing margin. Many interior areas have very low 
opportunity costs because they are distant from population clusters, markets and viable 
transport links. The converse is generally true for active deforestation areas, so higher-
opportunity-cost tracts provide the relevant targets for a program that pays to prevent 
clearing at the current deforestation margin. 
Taking this interior/frontier cost differential into account, the global results presented in 
Table 1 suggest that significant reduction in clearing at the current deforestation margin will 
require pricing that warrants conservation in a relatively high percentage of forested areas. At 
80%, for example, the associated offer price for sequestered CO2 is near $27/ton.  
Table 1:  CO2 Price Equivalent of Conversion Opportunity Cost: Tropical Forest 
Land 




50  0.62 
60  4.77 
70  12.00 
80  27.31 
90  71.95 
95  126.06 
99  289.84 
Source:  Resources for the Future (2011) 
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As we previously noted, the other relevant comparator is the marginal cost of CO2 
reduction in the energy sector. A conservative estimate of this cost is provided by the price 
at which CO2 emissions permits actually trade in the European Union Emissions Trading 
System (EU ETS). Drawing on data from BlueNext,6 the leading exchange, we calculate the 
average daily spot price of European Union Allowances for 2008-2012, which are issued by 
EU member states according to their national allocation plans. We match these daily spot 
prices (quoted in Euros) with daily US dollar exchange rates provided by the US Federal 
Reserve Board (FRB 2011). Figure 1 displays the daily BlueNext series in dollars, from the 
first reported trades on Feb. 29, 2008 to trades on April 21, 2011. After trading near $US 
40/ton CO2 in May-July 2008, the allowance price dropped to $10.31 in February 2009 
before rebounding to a range near $20. 
Figure 1: Daily EU Emissions Allowance Price, February 2008–April 2011 
 
The EU ETS price is the most reliable benchmark in this context, although it reflects the 
economics of the European energy sector, where emissions intensities are already low by 
world standards. It is certainly conservative from a global perspective, since there may well 
be plentiful opportunities for energy-sector CO2 emissions reduction at lower cost in 
developing countries. However, as we have shown in Table 1, an offer price substantially 
below $27/ton may be insufficient to induce conservation in many active deforestation 
areas. And, in any case, the need for long-run stability in pricing requires us to specify an 
offer price that will be maintained for a long period of time. We therefore settle on a price of 
$25/ton CO2, which is at the 82nd percentile for EU Allowance prices observed from 
February 2008 to April 2011, and higher than any price observed since January 1, 2009. We 
recognize that a significantly lower offer price might prove sufficient for the task, but we 
                                                       
6 BlueNext is a joint venture of the New York Stock Exchange and Caisse des Dépôts; a French 
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prefer to err on the high side to encourage a rapid, massive decrease in forest clearing. And it 
would be difficult to justify going substantially above $25/ton, since energy-sector 
opportunities would be plentiful in that range. 
4.2. Establishing the Rental Rate for Sequestered Carbon  
As Chomitz, et al. (2006) note7, a performance payment system rewards carbon 
sequestration by paying the equivalent of a “rental” value on each ton of CO2 that has not 
been emitted into the atmosphere. A natural standard for setting the rental value is 
multiplication of the CO2 price by the interest rate for long-run notes that are considered 
risk-free by the market. We take a conservative approach by using 5.45%, the average 10-
year rate on US treasury notes since 1990 (USFRB, 2011). This allows for the possibility of a 
substantial increase above the 2010 rate (3.22%) if inflation moves back toward historical 
levels. It is perfectly possible, of course, to use the current 10-year rate as the basis for 
setting payments in each year, but that might prove destabilizing in practice. A more realistic 
approach, which we adopt here, is to avoid resetting the rate in the short/intermediate term 
in order to maintain a stable offer price.  
4.3.  Setting the Area Standard for CO2 Pricing  
The final calculation step is translation of CO2 rental per ton into rental per hectare of 
tropical forest that is conserved rather than cleared. We follow Chomitz, et al. (2006)8 in 
adopting 500 tons of CO2 sequestered per hectare as the reference standard. When 
combined with the unit rental payment for CO2 (5.45% of $25/ton annually), it yields 
annual payments per tropical forest hectare conserved of $681. We adopt this as the unit 
payment for performance in the forest transition component of our incentive system. Given 
the need to reduce emissions quickly, we set the unit payment for performance in the 
REDD component at twice the transition level, or $1,362/hectare. Both transition and 
REDD payments are long-run obligations which may continue for many periods, as the 
previous examples have shown. In contrast, the third component – single-period payments 
for improvements – is only incurred once for improvement in a particular range. Because the 
implicit obligation is much shorter-term and the importance of promoting course reversal 
for rapid-clearing countries is very high, we set the single-period payment at four times the 
REDD payment, or $5,448/hectare. 
                                                       
7 For a more detailed discussion, see pp. 206-208. 
8 See p. 195.  
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5. Who Receives Payments?  
To be credible and sustainable, our proposed program must achieve the broadest possible 
geographic coverage to avoid displacing deforestation to non-covered areas. The coverage 
imperative provides a prime motivation for our proposal because, as we noted in Section 2, 
pilot REDD programs are already so mired in local negotiations, contracting and 
institutional development that extending the same approach to pan-tropical coverage would 
be prohibitively cumbersome, time-consuming and expensive.  
In principle, our system could offer performance incentives to the myriad local proprietors 
of forested land. However, global tractability dictates channeling performance rewards 
through national governments, for two main reasons. First, more decentralized programs 
could only reward clearly-identifiable proprietors. The associated information requirements 
would be prohibitive for a global program and, in many developing countries, land tenure 
problems would limit coverage and invite displacement of forest clearing to areas with ill-
defined property rights. Second, a national focus recognizes that many factors drive forest 
clearing, from export taxes to local road-building. Only national governments have the reach 
and authority to influence the full set of factors, and the information needed to determine 
which policy instruments should be adjusted to reduce forest clearing at least social cost. 
Our proposed system provides a powerful incentive for governments to make cost-
minimizing policy adjustments, since the unit reward for performance will not vary with local 
implementation costs. 
Although a focus on national governments appears inescapable, one critical exception has to 
be incorporated into a viable program. In many tropical forest countries, national 
governments coexist with indigenous communities that have traditional claims to the 
forested lands they inhabit. In some countries, forest clearing is concentrated in areas 
dominated by indigenous communities. As Figure 2 shows, Myanmar provides a striking 
example: The circled regions, identified by FORMA as areas of rapid forest clearing, overlap 
heavily with ethnic minority regions identified by the map.  
National governments may recognize indigenous claims rhetorically, and in some cases 
substantively, but disputes remain rife and they have escalated in some countries as 
preparations for REDD programs have begun. In Indonesia, for example, indigenous 
communities in forested areas of Sumatra, Kalimantan, Sulawesi and Irian Jaya are 
demanding direct access to REDD funds on two grounds: (1) They are the legitimate 
stewards of many forested areas, and (2) The prospect of large payments for conservation in 
their areas may induce governments to abrogate their traditional claims and divert payments 
to claimants that have more political influence. The unfortunate history of relations between  
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national governments and indigenous peoples in many countries lends credence to these 
claims, which are proving to be major sticking points for REDD preparations.9  
Figure 2: Myanmar: Forest Clearing and Indigenous Communities 
  
  
                                                       
9  For numerous related reports, see http://www.redd-monitor.org/. 
Rapid Forest Clearing, 2010 Rapid Forest Clearing, 2010 
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In our proposed system, we acknowledge these claims by allocating a significant percentage 
of performance payments to indigenous communities that inhabit forested areas. We 
recognize the difficulties associated with establishing an appropriate percentage, as well as 
the identities of legitimate claimants in each country. In our view, the claims questions is and 
will remain opaque to outsiders, and is better settled by consensus among the indigenous 
communities themselves. While we could attempt to develop methods for determining 
appropriate percentage allocations country-by-country, we would inevitably be hobbled by 
ignorance about local conditions. And, in any case, we believe that the exercise would not 
warrant the controversy that it would inevitably provoke. We therefore opt for simplicity and 
adopt the recommendation of Indonesia’s State Environment Minister (Simamora, 2010) by 
allocating 20% of performance payments to indigenous communities in each country.  
6. Implementation: The Tropical Forest Protection Fund 
We vest our system in a proposed Tropical Forest Protection Fund (TFPF) that will operate 
under simple, consistent, transparent global rules with a small professional staff. The TFPF 
will be overseen by a board of trustees who are highly-respected figures in international 
finance, conservation and indigenous rights. Under strictly-defined guidelines, they will be 
empowered to alter the TFPF’s operating parameters as future circumstances warrant. The 
TFPF will administer an automatic reward-for-performance system with the small set of 
parameters specified in Box 1. For this prototype exercise, we use the parameter values 
developed in the previous sections. 
Box 1: TFPF Parameter Values 
General parameters: 
1.  CO2 emissions charge per ton ($US 25) 
2.  Interest rate (5.45%) 
3.  Tons of CO2 emitted per hectare cleared (500) 
4.  REDD target date for zero forest clearing (2025) 
5.  REDD performance payment multiplier (2) 
6.  Short-run performance payment multiplier (4 x REDD) 
7.  Percentage of payments assigned to indigenous communities (20) 
Parameters for each country: 
8.  Initial clearing level 
9.  Initial multiplier (from income-predicted vs. actual deforestation) 
10.  Predicted year for zero net deforestation (from past income growth 
 
The TFPF will operate as an autonomous institution that rewards measured results without 
formal contracts with recipients. Its staff will have four basic functions: (1) Monitoring 
information about forest clearing and financial flows to ensure that the TFPF’s operations  
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conform to its charter; (2) Ensuring that payments go to the intended recipients; (3) 
Supplying the trustees with assessments of TFPF results and recommendations for altering 
parameters as conditions evolve; (4) Public reporting of results, including a color-coded 
rating system that summarizes the status of each recipient country in our three performance 
dimensions (transition line, REDD line, period-to-period improvement).  
6.1. Financing Mechanisms  
The TFPF will make regular performance payments to national governments and indigenous 
communities. Payments to national governments will be sent to officially-designated 
accounts used by those governments for global transactions. A government could, in 
principle, refuse to accept payments from the TFPF, but this seems extremely unlikely 
because the payments will have no strings attached. In case of refusal, the payments will be 
deposited in an escrow account, at interest, and the total accrued sum retransmitted to the 
government’s account in each period until the funds are accepted. 
Payment to indigenous communities will require delegated recipient entities. These may 
emerge rapidly in some countries but not in others. Recognizing this reality, the TFPF 
charter will specify that payments allocated to indigenous peoples in each country be 
deposited in an escrow account, at interest, and held until a recipient entity emerges. Before 
payment, each entity will be certified (and periodically re-certified) by an appropriately-
designated global council that will consult with representatives of indigenous communities 
and local experts in each country.  
The TFPF will pay for performance measured at frequent intervals, across many countries 
and regions, so trends in its overall payment flows should be relatively stable and predictable 
within the budgetary time frames that are relevant for donors. Birdsall and Leo (2011) have 
proposed several potential funding sources.  
If the economic analyses of Stern, et al. (2006), Nauclér and Enkvist (2009) and RFF (2011) 
are correct, then TFPF payments based on a CO2 charge of $25/ton will quickly reduce 
forest clearing in many countries. If even $25/ton induces a minimal response, then 
mitigation resources should be re-deployed to more cost-effective projects in the energy 
sector. Overall responsiveness to the TFPF should become apparent after a two- or three-
year adjustment period. We will explore the potential magnitudes of payments in Section 8.  
Inevitably, the TFPF will confront short-run surpluses and deficits as fixed donor funding 
cycles interact with fluctuating payment requirements. Short-run surpluses might well be 
transient, so they can be held in escrow, at interest, to cover subsequent short-run deficits. 
Additional shortfalls can be covered by vesting the TFPF with short-term borrowing 
authority, guaranteed by donor governments to maintain a premium rating. 
It is important to note that the TFPF will ultimately be self-liquidating. Its payments may 
increase sharply for some years, but they will inevitably fall as countries either reduce forest  
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clearing to zero or fail to keep clearing below the steadily-declining forest transition and 
REDD lines. As our illustrative exercise will show, the TFPF might reasonably be expected 
to self-liquidate after about 50 years of operation. 
6.2. Public Performance Ratings  
The information that drives incentive payments can also provide strong reputational 
incentives for improvement. Publication of payment flows alone is insufficient in this 
context, since payments will vary with forest size across countries achieving the same 
proportional reduction in clearing. To be effective, public performance ratings should be 
scale-free and extremely easy to interpret. At the firm level, such ratings have significantly 
improved the environmental performance of polluters in Indonesia, the Philippines, China 
and Vietnam.10 The ratings color-code good and bad environmental performance, judged 
against relevant local benchmarks (compliance with local regulations, community complaints, 
etc.). In a similar vein, the TFPF will color-code countries’ performance using the rules 
specified in Box 2, against benchmarks defined by transition lines, REDD lines and clearing 
in the previous period.  
Box 2: Public Performance Ratings for Reduced Forest Clearing 
Definitions:  
  C  = Current forest clearing 
dT  = C – [clearing on the forest transition line]  
dR  = C -  [clearing on the REDD line]  
dC  = C -  [clearing in the previous quarter].   
    Measure / benchmark     
Rating   
dT /  
transition line 
dR /  
REDD line 
dC /  
previous quarter   
Supplementary 
note 
Green    Negative  Negative  Negative    or C is zero 
Aqua    Negative  Negative  Positive/Zero    C Positive 
Blue    Negative/Zero  Positive/Zero  Negative    C Positive 
Blue    Positive/Zero  Negative/Zero  Negative    C Positive 
Yellow    Negative/Zero  Positive/Zero  Positive/Zero    C Positive 
Yellow    Positive/Zero  Negative/Zero  Positive/Zero    C Positive 
Orange    Positive  Positive  Negative    C Positive 
Red    Positive  Positive  Positive/Zero    C Positive 
 
                                                       
10 One of the authors (Wheeler) participated in the design and implementation of all four systems:  
PROPER in Indonesia; EcoWatch in the Philippines; GreenWatch in China; and the Environmental Information 
and Disclosure System (EIDS) in Vietnam. For further discussion and assessments of results, see Wheeler, et al. 
(2000); Afsah, Blackman and Ratunanda (2004), and Blackman (2010).  
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To summarize, a country whose forest clearing in a period is lower than all three 
benchmarks (or zero) gets the best rating (Green); a country whose clearing is higher than all 
three benchmarks gets the worst rating (Red); and ratings deteriorate as clearing successively 
exceeds clearing in the past quarter, the REDD line benchmark and the transition line 
benchmark. Since ratings are determined by local benchmarks, any country can receive any 
rating in each period. 
7. An Illustration for Eight East Asian Countries  
We illustrate the TFPF with an exercise for eight East Asian countries that have tropical 
forest regions: Cambodia, China, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Myanmar, Thailand and 
Vietnam. Figure 3 displays FORMA indices of forest clearing in the eight countries from 
December 2005 to December 2010.11 Each graph indexes monthly changes on the left axis 
and annualized changes on the right axis. The monthly series display marked seasonality, 
with strikingly-regular patterns in Cambodia, Malaysia and Myanmar. In the case of 
Myanmar, for example, the index reaches an annual minimum during the period October-
December, and then increases rapidly to an annual maximum during April-May. During the 
five-year period, the annual peak index value rises over tenfold, from 43.1 in May 2006 to 
460.5 in May 2010.  
Annualizing the data removes the seasonal component, permitting a clearer view of longer-
run trends. Figure 3 shows striking differences among countries during the past five years: 
declining trends for Indonesia, Lao PDR and China, with pronounced fluctuations around 
trend; steady increases (again with fluctuations) for Cambodia, Malaysia and Myanmar; and 
sudden increases in 2010 for Thailand and Vietnam. Pronounced scale differences across 
countries reflect differences in the geographic extent of large-scale clearing. In Indonesia, for 
example, the annualized index falls from 6,267 in July 2007 to 3,726 in December 2010. Lao 
PDR exhibits a similar proportional decline, but at much smaller scale, from a maximum of 
268 in February 2008 to 123 in December 2010. Changes in China’s southern tropical forests 
are similar in scale to the Laotian changes. 
Among countries with increasing trends, Malaysia and Myanmar have dominant scales. From 
December 2006 to December 2010, Malaysia’s annualized index rises from 2,107 to 3,099, 
and Myanmar’s from 148 to 1,847. In contrast, maximum index values for Cambodia, 
Thailand and Vietnam are 213, 39 and 116, respectively.  
                                                       
11  Each unit of forest clearing reported by FORMA is formally defined as “one square kilometer within 
which large-scale forest clearing has occurred with high probability since 2000”.  The monthly FORMA clearing 
index for a particular area is therefore the increase in square kilometers with a high probability of forest clearing 
since the previous month.  To eliminate normal seasonal fluctuations and other short-run transients, all monthly 
measures used for performance indicator calculations are 24-month moving averages.   
16 
For our illustration, we assume that TFPF operations began in January 2008 and establish 
payments and performance ratings through December 2010, the latest reporting month for 
FORMA. Then we assess the implications of alternative country responses for forest 
clearing and TFPF financing during the next several decades. We use the TFPF parameters 
that have been discussed in previous sections and summarized in Box 1. 








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































7.1. Assessment Benchmarks  
We believe that rapid feedback will increase the impact of payments and performance 
ratings, as well as cementing the credibility of the TFPF in its early years. Accordingly, our 
prototype system operates on a quarterly basis. We avoid short-term cyclical fluctuations by 
using 24-month moving averages of forest-clearing indices. FORMA estimates begin in 
December 2005, so the first observation available for assessment is the final quarter of 2007.  
Table 2 provides information for setting the eight countries’ forest transition lines. It 
presents alternative forecasts of the years when countries will reach normal zero-clearing 
income ($10,150), based on income growth rates during the past 10, 20 and 30 years. The 
first three columns report regression-estimated growth rates for real GDP per capita at 
purchasing power parity. Average growth rates and standard deviations are progressively 
lower as the estimation period expands from 10 to 30 years. These differences are reflected 
in estimated zero-clearing years, in the next three columns, whose average dates vary from 
2026 for the projection from growth in the past decade to 2035 for the projection from 
growth since 1980. When countries are ranked by year of arrival at normal zero-clearing 
income, Malaysia is first because it has already arrived (in 1997). Lao PDR is among the last 
to arrive in all cases. China and Thailand are the first arrivals after 2010, followed by 
Vietnam, then Indonesia and Myanmar. Rank correlations for the three projection sets are 
high, particularly for the 10-year and 30-year variants (ρ = .94).  
Since we are taking the long view in this illustration, we adopt 30-year growth rates for our 
benchmark projections. These yield the zero-clearing dates reported in column 4, in 
ascending order: Thailand (2013), China (2016), Vietnam (2036), Indonesia (2042), 
Cambodia (2051), Lao PDR (2059), Myanmar (2066).  
While we use historical evidence to set the forest transition line, the choice of end point for 
the REDD line is arbitrary. As we previously explained, we have chosen 2025 because it 
provides a strong incentive for countries to move aggressively on forest clearing. 
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Table 2: Historical Income Growth and Projected Zero-Clearing Years 
 
Regression-Estimated 
Annual Growth Rate, GDP 
Per Capita   
Year for Zero Clearing, 
Projected from Growth 
Rate   
Rank of Zero-Clearing Year 
(From Earliest Year)   
 
GDP Per Capita at Purchasing 




























2010    1980  1990  2000  2010 
Cambodiab  4.43  5.44  7.20    2051  2042  2034   6  6  5      779  1,024  1,909 
China  8.88  9.15  10.29    2016  2015  2015   3  2  3    526  1,103  2,682  6,794 
Indonesia  3.13  2.50  3.94    2042  2051  2035   5  8  6    1,521  2,131  2,754  3,971 
Lao PDR  3.43  4.29  5.49    2059  2048  2039   7  7  8    716  949  1,331  2,201 
Malaysia  3.54  2.80  3.20    1997  1997  1997   1  1  1    4,923  6,705  10,344  13,257 
Myanmar  4.41  7.74  8.34    2066  2039  2037   8  5  7    342  320  517  1,129 
Thailand  4.55  3.09  4.11    2013  2018  2015   2  3  3    2,282  4,028  5,645  8,302 
Vietnam  5.30  5.86  6.04    2036  2033  2032   4  4  4    627  910  1,606  2,832 
                                 
St. Dev.   1.83    2.41    2.43     24.30  18.73  14.89                   
Mean    4.71    5.11    6.08    2035  2030  2026                   
 
Correlations  Rank(30)  Rank(20) 
Rank(20)  0.76   
Rank(10)  0.94    0.87 
a Source: IMF (2011) 
b Cambodia data available after 1985. 
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7.2. Country Performance, 2008–2010  
Figure 4 highlights the magnitude of inter-country performance differences from Q1 2008 to 
Q4 2010. In each graph, the horizontal dashed line is initial benchmark clearing (actual 
clearing adjusted by the initial relative performance multiplier); the bold, downward-sloping 
dashed line is the country’s forest transition line, and the lighter downward-sloping line is its 
REDD line. For assessment, we separate the countries into three broad groups: 
(1) Poor performers: Cambodia, Malaysia and Myanmar. All three countries increase 
their annualized forest clearing from Q1 2008 to Q4 2010. Cambodia fluctuates near the 
initial benchmark line through 2009, and then increases clearing sharply through Q4 2010. 
Malaysia, having reached normal zero-clearing income in 1997, has a forest transition line set 
at zero clearing throughout the period. Its forest clearing continues to grow rapidly after Q1 
2008, so it moves steadily away from its initial benchmark and REDD lines. For Myanmar, 
the downward movements of benchmarks along the  
transition and REDD lines after Q1 2008 are dwarfed by the rapid growth of forest clearing, 
which nearly quadruples by Q4 2010. 
(2). Good performers: China, Indonesia and Lao PDR. All three countries exhibit 
declining trends in forest clearing during the three-year period. China begins well below its 
initial benchmark, which has been adjusted upward to reflect its superior performance on 
deforestation during the period 2000-2005. Its decline from 2008 to 2010 is relatively 
modest, but it starts from such a low point that it remains below the REDD line throughout 
the period, and below the transition line for most of it. Here it is worth recalling why we 
have given China the “head-start advantage” of an initial benchmark point higher than its 
actual clearing level. China’s deforestation rate during 2000-2005 was significantly below its 
expected rate, given its income during that period. As we have previously explained, we 
make the adjustment because it is important to reward previously-superior performance with 
an initial premium.  
Indonesia’s case is quite different: Its clearing actually exceeds initial clearing during the first 
few quarters, but then falls and remains below the forest transition line for the rest of the 
three-year period. However, its level-off after the initial plunge keeps it below the REDD 
line for only a short period. After that, it stays above the REDD line through Q4 2010.  
Lao PDR is the best performer in the group. At first its clearing tracks the declining REDD 
line (staying below the forest transition line). Then it plunges to a point far below the 
transition and REDD lines for the remainder of the period. 
(3). Mixed performers: Thailand and Vietnam. Thailand resembles Lao PDR through 
2009, but then it reverses course and resembles Cambodia and Myanmar in 2010. Vietnam 
has a different profile because, like China, it begins with a premium earned by slower-than-
expected deforestation during the period 2000-2005. Its clearing remains roughly constant  
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and far below the transition and REDD lines through 2009 and then, like Thailand, it jumps 
past both lines, to a point where clearing in Q4 2010 exceeds initial clearing in Q1 2008. 

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































7.3. Performance Payments  
Figure 5 plots the performance payment streams that accompany the forest clearing records 
in Figure 4. In each graph, transition payments are represented by thick dash/dot lines; 
REDD payments by dashed lines; and payments for quarterly improvements by solid lines. 
For the three poor performers, Cambodia, Malaysia and Myanmar, transition and REDD 
payments are zero throughout because clearing remains above the transition and REDD 
lines. Cambodia has a few quarters in which forest clearing drops, and these are reflected in 
the short pulse in quarterly payments. Similarly, forest-clearing drops in Myanmar during Q4 
2010, and this is reflected in a brief payment episode 
The payment profiles of the three good performers, China, Indonesia and Lao PDR, are 
strongly differentiated by their forest clearing patterns. China stays below the REDD line 
longer than it stays below the transition line, and the result is a REDD payment profile that 
rises higher and lasts longer than the transition payment profile. China also has a significant 
early set of quarterly performance payments, reflecting the decline in forest clearing during 
the corresponding period in Figure 4.  
Indonesia looks quite different: Its payment profiles are dominated by quarterly payments, 
which reflect the sharp drop in forest clearing that starts in late 2008. Indonesia’s transition 
payments increase during the period when it is well below the transition line, and level off as 
clearing levels off while the transition line continues to decline. REDD payments exhibit a 
small, brief increase during the short period when clearing is below the REDD line, but 
return to zero soon afterward.  
For Lao PDR, three downward movements in clearing during different intervals are 
rewarded by quarterly payments that peak in mid-2009. After the sharp decline Lao PDR 
remains well below the transition and REDD lines, and the result is steady growth in 
transition and REDD payments. 
Vietnam stays far below its transition and REDD lines for much of the three-year period, 
exceeding them both only toward the end. The result is rapid growth in transition and 
REDD payments, with a decline beginning only toward the end of the three-year period. 
Vietnam has relatively few periods in which forest clearing actually declines, and this is 
reflected in the sparse and relatively small payments for quarterly performance. In this 
context, it is worth noting why the decline in payments is not sharper after the jump in 
Vietnam’s forest clearing. Recall that credits for units of sequestered carbon are cumulative 
below the transition and REDD lines. At the same time, progressive subtraction of credits 
accompanies benchmark decreases along the lines themselves. Transition and REDD 
payments in any period reflect the difference between these two cumulative factors, which 
can create relatively long lags in the response of payments to sudden changes with respect to 
the lines. This explains why the sudden surge in Laotian clearing generates only a modest 
initial decline in payments: The country is still receiving rental payments for the many 
cumulative carbon units that have previously been sequestered. These prior credits will be  
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used up if clearing remains above the line for an extended period, and payment will return to 
zero  













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3:  Annual TFPF Payments to Government and Indigenous Recipients by Country, 2008–2010 
  Payment         
  2008    2009    2010    Totals 
Country  Government  Indigenous    Government  Indigenous    Government  Indigenous    Government  Indigenous  Grand total 
Cambodia  0.15  0.04    1.42  0.35    0  0    1.57  0.39  1.96 
China  14.89  3.72    21.99  5.50    18.77  4.69    55.65  13.91  69.56 
Indonesia  111.14  27.78    187.25  46.81    61.22  15.30    359.61  89.89  449.50 
Lao PDR  4.14  1.03    23.88  5.97    33.16  8.29    61.18  15.29  76.47 
Malaysia  0  0    0  0    0  0    0  0  0 
Myanmar  0  0    0  0    3.86  0.96    3.86  0.96  4.82 
Thailand  0.41  0.10    2.23  0.56    1.17  0.29    3.81  0.95  4.76 
Vietnam  7.27  1.82    17.8  4.45    19.23  4.81    44.30  11.08  55.38 
                         
Total  172.49    318.21    171.75        662.45 
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Thailand initially exhibits a plummet in forest clearing, followed by an equally rapid increase. 
The result is the dominant profile of quarterly performance payments during the period of 
decrease. Both transition and REDD payments only begin increasing after Thailand’s 
clearing falls past the respective lines, and the relative transience of this improvement 
dictates a relatively quick reversal of the transition and REDD payment streams. 
Table 3 provides totals for payments to the eight countries during the three-year period, 
divided into amounts paid to national governments and indigenous communities. Indonesia 
is the largest recipient by far, receiving about $449.5 million: $359.6 million for the national 
government and $89.9 million for indigenous communities. Significant payments also go to 
Lao PDR ($61.2 million to the government, $15.3 million to indigenous communities); 
China ($55.7 million; $13.9 million) and Vietnam ($44.3 million; $11.1 million). Overall, the 
TFPF makes payments of $662.5 million to the eight countries from 2008 to 2010.  
7.4. Public Performance Ratings  
Figure 6 presents quarterly performance ratings that reflect the rules specified in Box 2. The 
figure provides a striking picture of variation, both across countries and over time. Five 
countries are in the Green range for at least part of the time, with particularly long runs for 
China, Thailand and Lao PDR. On the other hand, seven countries have at least some Red 
ratings and one, Malaysia, is rated Red throughout. Myanmar and Cambodia also come close, 
with only a few observations better than Red. Lao PDR exhibits the most unambiguous 
improvement, moving from Orange/Red at the outset to consistent Green/Blue after a few 
quarters. Vietnam shows the most striking deterioration, with a long run in Green/Blue 
suddenly giving way to Orange/Red. Indonesia and Thailand exhibit the most variation, with 
ascents from Red to Green and then significant descents (to Yellow for Indonesia, Red again 
for Thailand). 
Figure 7 summarizes the pattern for the eight countries as a group. We calculate the regional 
performance rating using weighted country ratings, where color ratings are valued from 1 
(Red) to 6 (Green), and the weights are country shares in total eight-country forest clearing, 
period-by-period. As Table 4 shows, Indonesia, Malaysia and Myanmar dominate the other 
countries because their forest clearing operates on a far larger scale. The clearing shares of 
Malaysia and Myanmar increase through the 12-quarter assessment period. Since these 
countries are almost entirely Red-rated, they have a strong effect on the regional rating. 
Figure 7 shows that the regional average is never higher than Yellow and stays mostly in the 
Orange/Red range.  
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Figure 6:  Country Performance Ratings, Q1 2008 to Q4 2010 
 


































































Figure 7:  Weighted Average Performance Rating: Eight Countries 
 
We believe that such color-coded ratings are useful performance indicators, since they are 
both easy for the public to interpret and grounded in a detailed, three-dimensional 
performance assessment. In summary, Figure 6 indicates that China, Lao PDR and Vietnam 
are generally good performers; Cambodia, Malaysia and Myanmar are poor performers, and 























Table 4a: Annualized Forest Clearing Indexa 
  2007    2008    2009    2010 
  Q4    Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4    Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4    Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4 
Cambodia  101    105  110  110  111    107  104  107  111    127  152  158  166 
China  237    249  242  238  233    229  224  216  216    224  231  229  231 
Indonesia  4,910    5,040  5,139  5,212  4,698    4,365  4,138  4,282  4,577    4,620  4,607  4,433  4,367 
Lao PDR  218    223  209  207  205    187  147  139  135    123  126  125  124 
Malaysia  2,234    2,334  2,373  2,408  2,447    2,489  2,537  2,596  2,653    2,687  2,796  2,848  2,909 
Myanmar  448    502  681  818  864    924  1,197  1,393  1,467    1,610  1,918  1,936  1,918 
Thailand  18    19  19  18  17    15  12  11  10    10  14  19  23 
Vietnam  31    33  37  35  37    35  31  32  34    40  53  62  70 
 
Table 4b: Percent of Total Annualized Forest Clearing 
  2007    2008    2009    2010 
  Q4    Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4    Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4    Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4 
Cambodia  1.2    1.2  1.3  1.2  1.3    1.3  1.2  1.2  1.2    1.3  1.5  1.6  1.7 
China  2.9    2.9  2.8  2.6  2.7    2.7  2.7  2.5  2.3    2.4  2.3  2.3  2.4 
Indonesia  59.9    59.3  58.3  57.6  54.6    52.3  49.3  48.8  49.7    48.9  46.6  45.2  44.5 
Lao PDR  2.7    2.6  2.4  2.3  2.4    2.2  1.8  1.6  1.5    1.3  1.3  1.3  1.3 
Malaysia  27.3    27.4  26.9  26.6  28.4    29.8  30.2  29.6  28.8    28.5  28.3  29  29.7 
Myanmar  5.5    5.9  7.7  9  10    11.1  14.3  15.9  15.9    17.1  19.4  19.7  19.6 
Thailand  0.2    0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2    0.2  0.1  0.1  0.1    0.1  0.1  0.2  0.2 
Vietnam  0.4    0.4  0.4  0.4  0.4    0.4  0.4  0.4  0.4    0.4  0.5  0.6  0.7 
 
a Formally dimensioned in km2, but not directly comparable with conventional forest clearing estimates. See Footnote 11 for a detailed discussion  
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8. Alternative Futures and Their Implications for Finance  
Although we believe that our illustration for 2008-2010 provides useful insights, we readily 
acknowledge that one of its implicit premises is artificial. The TFPF did not exist during that 
period, nor did any other REDD-type incentive system, so our prototype payments and 
ratings are assigned to countries that were operating with no expectation of external rewards 
for good performance in forest clearing. To motivate our forecasting exercise, we assume 
that the TFPF incentives were consistently applied during 2008-2010, and that all eight 
countries have been persuaded that the TFPF is a credible institution. They respond with 
reduced forest clearing, in anticipation of substantial financial and reputational rewards. 
To provide a benchmark assessment of the financial implications, we assume that all eight 
countries are fully organized to respond by 2012, and reduce forest clearing to zero in 
another five years. Then we investigate alternative scenarios in which countries respond 
faster or slower, with different REDD target years and transition lines anchored by different 
zero-clearing years. We compare results using present values of payment streams.  
8.1. A Halt to Forest Clearing by 2017  
Using our benchmark assumptions, Figure 8 plots transition lines, REDD lines and 
annualized forest clearing through 2030. Country cases are very different, because reduced 
clearing after 2010 starts from different positions relative to the transition and REDD lines. 
In general, the poorer countries benefit most from incentive payments because their 
transition lines have shallow slopes that reflect distant zero-clearing years. Examples are 
provided by Indonesia, Lao PDR and Vietnam, with a particularly powerful effect for Lao 
PDR because it is already well below its transition and REDD lines in Q4 2010. As the 
figure shows, the three countries earn substantial performance payment flows in all three 
dimensions (quarterly reduction, transition line and REDD line).  
The cases of Cambodia, Malaysia and Myanmar are quite different. Cambodia reverses 
course in short order, moving from clearing well above the transition line in Q4 2010 to 
clearing below both transition and REDD lines after 2014. Cambodia therefore benefits 
from three payment streams: Rewards for quarterly improvements; REDD payments as long 
as clearing stays below the REDD line, and prolonged transition line payments because 
Cambodia does not achieve zero-clearing income ($10,150) until 2051 at its projected growth 
rate (4.43%).  
Myanmar’s path is similar to Cambodia’s, although Myanmar’s forest clearing in Q4 2010 is 
higher relative to its initial benchmark, so it has less time beneath the REDD line to collect 
payments. On the other hand, its rapid descent from high initial clearing ensures a flow of 
large quarterly performance payments, and its low initial income ($US 859 in 2005) and  
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moderate projected growth rate (4.41%) determine a late zero-clearing year (2066) and a long 
period in which it receives transition line payments.  


























































































































































































































































































































Malaysia’s path also looks similar to Cambodia’s, with one major difference: Having reached 
normal zero-clearing income in 1997, Malaysia has a transition path that is constant at zero 
throughout the period. Therefore, its rapid reduction of clearing after 2010 earns only two 
sets of reward payments (REDD line and quarterly improvement). And both series are 
relatively short-lived, since Malaysia’s zero clearing line intersects with its REDD line in 
2025. 
China and Thailand are differentiated from the other countries by their relationships to their 
transition lines. For each country, the transition line arrives at zero clearing before the actual 
clearing path. This is traceable to a high initial income for Thailand ($7,132) and a high 
projected income growth rate for China (8.88%). Like Malaysia, both countries receive 
performance payments in only two dimensions, REDD and quarterly. 
8.2. Payment Flows, 2011–2067  
Figure 9 and Appendix Table A2 extend the country scenarios to the termination of 
payments in 2067. The most striking patterns are evident for Cambodia, Myanmar, 
Indonesia and Lao PDR, whose late zero-clearing years ensure that transition line payments 
dominate the overall payment flows. Nevertheless, quarterly and REDD line payments are 
frequently at parity with or greater than transition line payments in the early years, when it is 
most important to lock countries into the system by offering significant rewards.  
Among Cambodia’s three payment streams, quarterly payments are $6.3 million annually 
through 2017, REDD line payments reach a maximum of $21.4 million in 2020, and 
transition line payments peak at $188.3 million in 2033. Quarterly payments yield the most 
income in the early years (2011-2015). Quarterly performance payments dominate for 
Myanmar (at $73.2 million/year) through 2017. REDD line payments, which peak at $98.8 
million in 2021, remain significant in the payment stream through 2024. Ultimately, however, 
Myanmar’s payment stream is dominated by the long, shallow trajectory of its transition line. 
Transition payments rise to a maximum of $1.24 billion in 2041, and then decline steadily to 
zero in 2067.  
Indonesia’s scale is the largest, and this is reflected in its payment flows. It receives negligible 
REDD payments, because its decline in clearing after 2010 never compensates for its earlier 
re-crossing of the REDD line and loss of rental credits (see Figure 4). Quarterly 
performance and transition line payments are both very large, however, particularly the 
latter. Indonesia receives annual payments of $166.6 million for quarterly improvements 
from 2011 to 2017. At the same time, transition payments speedily increase to very large 
values, reaching a maximum of $4.37 billion in 2025. Lao PDR displays similar transition line 
dominance, with payments reaching a maximum of $513.9 million in 2033.    
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Figure 9: Country Financial Flows with Zero Clearing in 2017 ($US Million) 










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Quarterly Reduction Payments 
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Countries that are initially richer or fast-growing display a different balance across payment 
streams, because their transition payments terminate much sooner. Malaysia’s case is 
dominated by REDD line payments (although quarterly payments are also significant 
initially) because it receives no transition line payments. The same thing is basically true for 
China, and Thailand’s brief transition payment series is matched by its REDD and quarterly 
performance payments. Vietnam’s rapid projected income growth produces a similar effect: 
The dominance of REDD payments in the early years is followed by a relatively brief surge 
of transition payments which ends in 2029. 
Appendix Table A3 summarizes total payment flows for the eight countries from 2008 to 
2067. The early years, 2011-2013, are dominated by quarterly performance payments as 
countries begin rapid reduction of forest clearing but some remain above their transition and 
REDD lines. Total payments are $374.3 million/year. Then REDD payments increase 
quickly as clearing in most countries drops below their REDD lines. REDD payments reach 
$523.4 million/year in 2020, and then decline to zero in 2025 as REDD lines terminate at 
zero. Meanwhile, transition payment flows rapidly increase to dominant status. They reach 
$1 billion by 2015, $2 billion by 2017, $4 billion by 2020, and a maximum of $5.74 billion in 
2026, before tapering to $5.2 billion in 2030, $1.9 billion in 2040, $1.3 billion in 2050 and 
$524 million in 2060. Payments cease in 2067, after Myanmar reaches the terminal point on 
its transition line. 
Total payments from the TFPF peak in 2026 at $5.74 billion, of which $1.15 billion goes 
directly to indigenous communities. During the 60-year period from 2008 to 2067, total 
payments amount to $2.95 billion for quarterly performance improvements, $3.30 billion for 
REDD line performance, and $124.96 billion for transition line performance. Total 
payments overall are $130.94 billion, of which $104.75 billion goes to national governments 
and $26.19 billion to indigenous communities.  
8.3. Alternative Futures  
Our first scenario has assumed that all countries reach zero clearing in 2017, the REDD line 
target year is 2025, and normal zero-clearing years are projected using growth rates for 1980-
2010. In this section, we consider a much broader set of alternatives based on all 
combinations of the following settings: historical growth experiences (1980-2010, 1990-2010, 
2000-2010). REDD target years (2020, 2025, 2030); and years in which countries achieve 
zero clearing (2012, 2015, 2017, 2020, 2030). 
Table 5 summarizes the results using present values of total payments and average payments 
by decade. In each case, 80% of the payments are allocated to national governments and 
20% to indigenous communities. We order the table in a three-way sort, by increasing zero-
clearing year, decreasing REDD terminal year, and decreasing growth rate calculation years. 
Figures 10.1 – 10.3 summarize the table information in box plots. Figure 10.1 shows that our 
benchmark scenario, which projects income growth from 30-year samples, is the  
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intermediate case. Present values of total payment flows are generally higher for the 20-year 
benchmark, and much lower for the 10-year benchmark. As Table 5 shows, the 10-year 
result reflects recent growth rates that are significantly higher than longer-run rates. Higher 
growth rates generate more rapid increases in projected incomes. These lead to arrival at 
normal zero-clearing income ($10,150) closer to the present, which means fewer years of 
annual rental payments for clearing that is below the transition path. 
Figure 10.2 presents box plots for REDD line termination in 2020, 2025 and 2030. Overall, 
these variations have fewer consequences than the others. Median values for the 
distributions are nearly identical, although extending the target year does increase higher-
range values. 
Figure 10.3 shows that the most significant parameter by far is the year in which all eight 
countries arrive at zero clearing. The five box plots summarize results over a wide range of 
responses, from near-instantaneous (clearing falls to zero by next year) to 20-year adjustment 
(zero clearing in 2030). The relationship is non-linear, with rapidly-falling present values as 
the adjustment period increases. From a median of $105.3 billion for the shortest adjustment 
period (2012), the present value of total payments falls successively to $69.6 billion (2015), 
$54.2 billion (2017), $36.5 billion (2020) and $12.6 billion (2030). 
The other columns of Table 5 provide information on payment distributions across decades. 
To illustrate using an extreme case, the second row assumes a REDD terminal year of 2030 
and income growth projected from the 20-year sample. This variant produces the shallowest 
transition and REDD lines, on average, and consequently the longest rental payment periods 
for clearing below the two lines. These periods are maximized by the second-row 
assumption that forest clearing ends next year. The result is the greatest financial 
requirement in the whole set: a present value of $144.8 billion, with average annual payment 
flows across the decades of $9.7 billion, $14.1 billion, $12.7 billion and $3.7 billion. All 
payments terminate by 2049 in this scenario because all countries have reached the normal 
zero-clearing income ($10,150). 
Our benchmark exercise for this paper is more conservative, assuming a terminal clearing 
year of 2017, REDD line target of 2025, and income growth projected from the 30-year 
sample. This variant yields a much lower present value ($54.2 billion) and decadal average 
payment values ($3.4 billion, $5.4 billion, $3.2 billion, $1.7 billion, $970 million, $317 
million), although the latter persist for two additional decades because some countries are 
slower to arrive at zero-clearing income.  
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Table 5:  Payment Flows in Alternative Scenarios, 2010–2069 







Present Value of Total 













2012  2030  30  125,189  9,316  12,389  6,008  1,963  1,086  302 
2012  2030  20  144,840  9,685  14,064  12,682  3,673  0  0 
2012  2030  10  91,364  8,634  8,907  780  0  0  0 
2012  2025  30  105,291  7,970  9,427  6,010  1,968  1,087  302 
2012  2025  20  124,941  8,339  11,102  12,686  3,674  0  0 
2012  2025  10  71,463  7,289  5,945  782  0  0  0 
2012  2020  30  92,079  6,141  8,754  6,010  1,968  1,087  302 
2012  2020  20  111,729  6,510  10,429  12,686  3,674  0  0 
2012  2020  10  58,251  5,460  5,272  782  0  0  0 
2015  2030  30  81,294  5,452  8,403  4,196  1,765  973  266 
2015  2030  20  99,659  5,851  10,158  10,324  2,248  0  0 
2015  2030  10  51,827  4,812  5,021  323  0  0  0 
2015  2025  30  69,627  4,449  6,925  4,210  1,785  993  289 
2015  2025  20  87,981  4,848  8,685  10,351  2,249  0  0 
2015  2025  10  40,141  3,810  3,550  342  0  0  0 
2015  2020  30  66,541  4,084  6,668  4,227  1,810  1,015  312 
2015  2020  20  84,883  4,484  8,433  10,384  2,251  0  0 
2015  2020  10  37,032  3,446  3,300  364  0  0  0 
2017  2030  30  59,334  3,680  6,199  3,194  1,658  927  272 
2017  2030  20  76,635  4,094  8,018  8,787  1,471  0  0 
2017  2030  10  33,029  3,071  2,935  266  0  0  0 
2017  2025  30  54,230  3,350  5,407  3,200  1,667  927  272 
2017  2025  20  71,528  3,764  7,226  8,797  1,473  0  0 
2017  2025  10  27,913  2,741  2,145  270  0  0  0 
2017  2020  30  52,959  3,197  5,280  3,232  1,715  970  317 
2017  2020  20  70,222  3,612  7,107  8,857  1,478  0  0 
2017  2020  10  26,585  2,589  2,029  312  0  0  0 
2020  2030  30  37,958  2,312  3,679  2,002  1,478  839  255 
2020  2030  20  53,337  2,743  5,590  6,453  587  0  0 
2020  2030  10  17,751  1,834  1,020  191  0  0  0 
2020  2025  30  36,440  2,236  3,387  2,030  1,523  877  298 
2020  2025  20  51,770  2,667  5,304  6,506  590  0  0  
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Table 5, continued 
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2020  2025  10  16,157  1,758  737  224  0  0  0 
2020  2020  30  36,471  2,220  3,373  2,075  1,594  929  345 
2020  2020  20  51,746  2,651  5,297  6,587  608  0  0 
2020  2020  10  16,083  1,742  734  281  0  0  0 
2030  2030  30  16,293  965  1,080  855  999  701  319 
2030  2030  20  12,733  981  974  354  24  0  0 
2030  2030  10  11,395  919  853  157  0  0  0 
2030  2025  30  16,111  941  1,080  855  999  701  319 
2030  2025  20  12,551  957  974  354  24  0  0 
2030  2025  10  11,214  895  853  157  0  0  0 
2030  2020  30  16,007  933  1,080  855  999  701  319 
2030  2020  20  12,447  949  974  354  24  0  0 
2030  2020  10  11,110  887  853  157  0  0  0  
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Figure 10:  Scenario Variations in Present Value of Total Payments 
  10.1: Historical Growth Period      10.2: REDD Target Years 
 
  10.3:  Zero Clearing Years 
 
Such variation across scenarios has major implications for financing. Is it plausible to 
suppose that all tropical forest countries would halt clearing almost overnight? Our results 
show that the financial incentive to do so would be huge. In our benchmark scenario for 
example (REDD target year 2025, 30-year growth sample), shortening the zero-clearing year 
from 2017 to 2012 would nearly double the present value of payments (from $54.2 billion to 
$105.3 billion). And, as we previously noted, the available evidence indicates that a large 
percentage of tropical forest land has a conversion opportunity cost below our proposed 
CO2 price ($25/ton). By implication, the global response to the TFPF might well be a rapid, 
massive reduction of tropical forest clearing. This would, of course, be a very good thing. 
But, as the results in Table 5 show, it would also require that the East Asia TFPF have 
standby credit authority for disbursements as high as $10-14 billion per year for its first two 
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the larger scheme of things these are not enormous sums. And it would seem well worth the 
cost, if the TFPF succeeded in halting tropical forest clearing so quickly  
9. Summary and Conclusions  
In this paper we have developed and illustrated a global incentive system, the Tropical 
Forest Protection Fund (TFPF), for promoting rapid reduction of forest clearing in tropical 
countries. The TFPF is a cash-on-delivery system that rewards independently-monitored 
performance without formal contracts. The system responds to forest tenure problems in 
many countries by dividing incentive payments between national governments, which 
command the greatest number of instruments that affect forest clearing, and indigenous 
communities, which often have tenure rights in forested lands. 
The TFPF incorporates both monetary and reputational incentives, which are calculated 
quarterly. The monetary incentives are cash transfers based on measured performance, while 
the reputational incentives are publicly-disclosed, color-coded performance ratings for each 
country. All incentives are calculated using three benchmark dimensions: (1) a forest 
transition line that declines from initial benchmark forest clearing to zero in a country’s 
projected year of arrival at normal zero-clearing income per capita ($10,150); a REDD line 
that declines from initial benchmark clearing to zero in a specified target year; and (3) forest 
clearing in the previous quarter. Dimension (1) rewards countries whose progress exceeds 
long-run expectations, given their forest clearing history and development status. Dimension 
(2) provide additional incentives for meeting or exceeding ambitious REDD goals. Rewards 
in dimension (3) encourage course reversal for countries whose forest clearing has taken 
them beyond the transition and REDD lines.  
Drawing on monthly forest clearing indices from the new FORMA (Forest Monitoring for 
Action) database, we have developed a prototype system for eight East Asian countries: 
Cambodia, China, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam. A 
system with identical design principles could be implemented by single or multiple donors 
for individual or multiple forest proprietors within one or more countries, as well as national 
or local governments in individual countries, tropical regions, or the global pan-tropics. 
Our illustrative results demonstrate the importance of financial flexibility in the design of the 
proposed TFPF. The available evidence on forest conversion economics suggests that our 
proposed pricing and payment scheme could induce a rapid, massive reduction of tropical 
forest clearing. If this occurs, the East Asia TFPF will need standby authority to disburse 
payments as high as $10-14 billion annually for two decades. This financial burden will not 
persist, however, because the TFPF is designed to self-liquidate after all countries have 
reached the terminal points on their REDD and transition lines. We estimate that the East 
Asian TFPF can be closed by 2070, with its major financial responsibility discharged by 
2040.   
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Appendix A1 
Estimating the Relationship Between the Deforestation Rate and Income  
Cropper and Griffiths (1994) find an environmental Kuznets (inverse U-shaped) curve for 
the deforestation rate whose peak lies between per capita incomes of $US 7,000 and 
16,000.12 In this paper, we re-estimate the relationship using data from the period 1990-2010. 
We use a panel dataset based on forest cover reported by the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators for the years 1990, 2000, 2005 and 2010. We calculate average 
annual deforestation rates for each interval (1990-2000, etc.), and do the same for income. 
Our income measure is per capita GDP at purchasing power parity reported by the IMF 
(IMF, 2011), converted to constant $US 2005 using the US implicit price deflator for GDP. 
Using these measures for 195 countries, we pool the data to form a panel. Then we estimate 
the relationship between the deforestation rate and log GDP per capita by fixed effects, 
random effects and robust regression.  
Our results are reported in Table A1. Following Cropper and Griffiths, we also estimated the 
same equations with the log of population density and a quadratic term to test for the 
environmental Kuznets relationship. Neither population density nor the inverse U-shaped 
relationship was significant in any of these experiments. We conclude that recent evidence is 
consistent with a monotone declining relationship between deforestation and income. 
The first six columns in Table A1 report results and Hausman tests for fixed- and random-
effects estimates for the full country sample and cases where 1% and 5% of sample 
observations are clipped from the tails of the distribution of deforestation rates. We 
experiment with clipping to test for robustness, given the presence of numerous outlier 
values in the tails of the distribution. Random effects estimation is preferable because it is 
more efficient, but its use depends on failure of the appropriate Hausman test to reject the 
null hypothesis of equal parameters in random and fixed effects estimation. As the table 
shows, outliers cause the random- and fixed-effects estimates to diverge significantly in the 
full and 1% clipped samples. However, failure of the Hausman test does occur in the 5% 
clipped sample (χ2 1.56; p=.2118), and the results for that sample are very similar to the 
robust regression results for the full, 1% clipped and 5% clipped samples.  
As we explain in the paper, econometric estimation of the deforestation/income relationship 
has two uses in this context: (1) Calculation of the ratio between predicted and actual 
deforestation for each country, which determines the initial point for its forest transition and 
REDD lines; and (2) Calculation of the income at which the representative sample country 
arrives at zero net deforestation. Zero-deforestation income is calculated for each regression 
                                                       
12 We have adjusted the Cropper/Griffith estimates to $US 2010 using the US GDP deflator.  Variations in 
the EKC peak are attributable to differences in population density.  
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by setting the deforestation rate at zero in the linear estimating equation, solving for the 
associated value of log GDP per capita, and calculating the exponential of the log. Estimated 
incomes for relevant regressions are presented in the table. 
The slope of the transition path is a critical determinant of performance incentives in our 
system: The steeper the slope, ceteris paribus, the shorter the period in which countries earn 
positive incentives for forest clearing at levels below the forest transition line. In the table, 
the 5%-clipped random effects estimate and the three robust regression estimates are 
statistically indistinguishable. To provide the maximum benefit of the doubt, we opt for the 
5%-clipped random effects estimates because they yield the largest zero-deforestation 
income ($10,147, which we round to $10,150). 
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Table A1: The Deforestation Rate and Income Per Capita 
 
Dependent Variable: Annual Deforestation Rate (1990-2000, 2000-2005, 2005-2010) 
 
                Full                             1%               5%         Full    1%    5% 
             Sample                              Clipped        Clipped                    Sample         Clipped           Clipped 
  Random  Fixed  Random  Fixed  Random  Fixed    
  Effects  Effects  Effects  Effects  Effects  Effects  Robust  Robust  Robust 
Log GDP Per Capita  -2.619  1.594  -1.834  0.063  -1.272  -0.704  -1.303  -1.289  -1.221 (PPP 
Const $US 2005)  (5.37)**  (1.02)  (5.63)**  (0.07)  (5.98)**  (1.40)  (9.95)**  (9.87)**  (9.77)** 
Constant  22.946  -13.161  16.452  0.220  11.736  6.861  11.976  11.850  11.226
  (5.43)**  (0.99)  (5.82)**  (0.03)  (6.33)**  (1.58)  (10.56)**  (10.46)**  (10.32)** 
Hausman           χ2 8.14                  χ2 5.34            χ2 1.56 
Tests                    (p=.0043)                        (p=.0209)           (p=.2118)              
Observations   512  512  500  500  460  460  512  500  460 
Countries  174  174  173  173  170  170       
R-squared  0.13  0.13  0.13  0.13  0.16  0.16          
 




Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses                   
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%     
            
  




Annual Payment Flows with Transition to Zero Clearing in 2017 by Country ($US 
Million) 
 

















Cambodia  2008  0.0  0.0  0.2  0.2  0.1  0.0 
Cambodia  2009  0.0  0.0  1.8  1.8  1.4  0.4 
Cambodia  2010  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Cambodia  2011  0.0  0.0  6.3  6.3  5.1  1.3 
Cambodia  2012  0.0  0.0  6.3  6.3  5.1  1.3 
Cambodia  2013  0.0  0.0  6.3  6.3  5.1  1.3 
Cambodia  2014  0.8  0.0  6.3  7.2  5.7  1.4 
Cambodia  2015  6.1  0.2  6.3  12.6  10.1  2.5 
Cambodia  2016  16.4  2.6  6.3  25.3  20.2  5.1 
Cambodia  2017  31.9  8.3  6.3  46.5  37.2  9.3 
Cambodia  2018  50.5  15.4  0.0  65.8  52.7  13.2 
Cambodia  2019  68.2  19.9  0.0  88.1  70.5  17.6 
Cambodia  2020  84.8  21.4  0.0  106.1  84.9  21.2 
Cambodia  2021  100.1  19.9  0.0  120.0  96.0  24.0 
Cambodia  2022  114.2  15.4  0.0  129.6  103.6  25.9 
Cambodia  2023  127.0  7.9  0.0  134.9  107.9  27.0 
Cambodia  2024  138.7  0.5  0.0  139.1  111.3  27.8 
Cambodia  2025  149.1  0.0  0.0  149.1  119.3  29.8 
Cambodia  2026  158.3  0.0  0.0  158.3  126.6  31.7 
Cambodia  2027  166.2  0.0  0.0  166.2  133.0  33.2 
Cambodia  2028  173.0  0.0  0.0  173.0  138.4  34.6 
Cambodia  2029  178.5  0.0  0.0  178.5  142.8  35.7 
Cambodia  2030  182.8  0.0  0.0  182.8  146.2  36.6 
Cambodia  2031  185.8  0.0  0.0  185.8  148.7  37.2 
Cambodia  2032  187.7  0.0  0.0  187.7  150.1  37.5 
Cambodia  2033  188.3  0.0  0.0  188.3  150.6  37.7 
Cambodia  2034  187.7  0.0  0.0  187.7  150.1  37.5 
Cambodia  2035  185.8  0.0  0.0  185.8  148.7  37.2 
Cambodia  2036  182.8  0.0  0.0  182.8  146.2  36.6 
Cambodia  2037  178.5  0.0  0.0  178.5  142.8  35.7 
Cambodia  2038  173.0  0.0  0.0  173.0  138.4  34.6 
Cambodia  2039  166.2  0.0  0.0  166.2  133.0  33.2 
Cambodia  2040  158.3  0.0  0.0  158.3  126.6  31.7 
Cambodia  2041  149.1  0.0  0.0  149.1  119.3  29.8 
Cambodia  2042  138.7  0.0  0.0  138.7  110.9  27.7 
Cambodia  2043  127.0  0.0  0.0  127.0  101.6  25.4 
Cambodia  2044  114.2  0.0  0.0  114.2  91.3  22.8  
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Cambodia  2045  100.1  0.0  0.0  100.1  80.1  20.0 
Cambodia  2046  84.8  0.0  0.0  84.8  67.8  17.0 
Cambodia  2047  68.2  0.0  0.0  68.2  54.6  13.6 
Cambodia  2048  50.5  0.0  0.0  50.5  40.4  10.1 
Cambodia  2049  31.5  0.0  0.0  31.5  25.2  6.3 
Cambodia  2050  11.2  0.0  0.0  11.2  9.0  2.2 
Cambodia  2051  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
 
China  2008  6.1  9.0  4.3  19.3  15.5  3.9 
China  2009  5.7  20.3  4.5  30.5  24.4  6.1 
China  2010  0.0  23.5  0.0  23.5  18.8  4.7 
China  2011  0.0  18.3  8.8  27.1  21.7  5.4 
China  2012  0.0  11.9  8.8  20.7  16.6  4.1 
China  2013  0.0  5.1  8.8  13.9  11.1  2.8 
China  2014  0.0  0.1  8.8  8.9  7.2  1.8 
China  2015  0.0  0.0  8.8  8.8  7.0  1.8 
China  2016  0.0  0.0  8.8  8.8  7.0  1.8 
China  2017  0.0  0.0  8.8  8.8  7.0  1.8 
China  2018  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
 
Indonesia  2008  1.2  0.0  137.3  138.4  110.8  27.7 
Indonesia  2009  59.4  13.4  149.7  222.6  178.1  44.5 
Indonesia  2010  38.2  0.0  0.0  38.2  30.6  7.6 
Indonesia  2011  22.8  0.0  166.6  189.5  151.6  37.9 
Indonesia  2012  94.9  0.0  166.6  261.6  209.3  52.3 
Indonesia  2013  258.8  0.0  166.6  425.4  340.3  85.1 
Indonesia  2014  514.3  0.0  166.6  681.0  544.8  136.2 
Indonesia  2015  861.6  0.0  166.6  1,028.2  822.6  205.6 
Indonesia  2016  1,300.5  0.0  166.6  1,467.2  1,173.7  293.4 
Indonesia  2017  1,831.2  0.0  166.6  1,997.9  1,598.3  399.6 
Indonesia  2018  2,401.5  0.0  0.0  2,401.5  1,921.2  480.3 
Indonesia  2019  2,907.3  0.0  0.0  2,907.3  2,325.9  581.5 
Indonesia  2020  3,338.2  0.0  0.0  3,338.2  2,670.6  667.6 
Indonesia  2021  3,694.1  0.0  0.0  3,694.1  2,955.3  738.8 
Indonesia  2022  3,975.1  0.0  0.0  3,975.1  3,180.1  795.0 
Indonesia  2023  4,181.2  0.0  0.0  4,181.2  3,345.0  836.2 
Indonesia  2024  4,312.3  0.0  0.0  4,312.3  3,449.9  862.5 
Indonesia  2025  4,368.5  0.0  0.0  4,368.5  3,494.8  873.7 
Indonesia  2026  4,349.8  0.0  0.0  4,349.8  3,479.9  870.0 
Indonesia  2027  4,256.1  0.0  0.0  4,256.1  3,404.9  851.2 
Indonesia  2028  4,087.5  0.0  0.0  4,087.5  3,270.0  817.5 
Indonesia  2029  3,844.0  0.0  0.0  3,844.0  3,075.2  768.8 
Indonesia  2030  3,525.5  0.0  0.0  3,525.5  2,820.4  705.1 
Indonesia  2031  3,132.1  0.0  0.0  3,132.1  2,505.7  626.4 
Indonesia  2032  2,663.8  0.0  0.0  2,663.8  2,131.0  532.8 
Indonesia  2033  2,120.5  0.0  0.0  2,120.5  1,696.4  424.1  
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Indonesia  2034  1,502.3  0.0  0.0  1,502.3  1,201.9  300.5 
Indonesia  2035  809.2  0.0  0.0  809.2  647.4  161.8 
Indonesia  2036  121.3  0.0  0.0  121.3  97.0  24.3 
Indonesia  2037  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
               
Lao PDR  2008  0.6  0.0  4.7  5.3  4.2  1.1 
Lao PDR  2009  8.7  3.3  18.6  30.6  24.5  6.1 
Lao PDR  2010  27.5  12.9  3.2  43.5  34.8  8.7 
Lao PDR  2011  46.9  19.1  4.7  70.8  56.6  14.2 
Lao PDR  2012  68.6  23.4  4.7  96.8  77.4  19.4 
Lao PDR  2013  92.8  26.0  4.7  123.5  98.8  24.7 
Lao PDR  2014  119.5  26.8  4.7  151.1  120.9  30.2 
Lao PDR  2015  148.7  25.9  4.7  179.4  143.5  35.9 
Lao PDR  2016  180.4  23.3  4.7  208.4  166.7  41.7 
Lao PDR  2017  214.6  18.9  4.7  238.2  190.6  47.6 
Lao PDR  2018  249.8  11.4  0.0  261.1  208.9  52.2 
Lao PDR  2019  283.0  1.0  0.0  284.0  227.2  56.8 
Lao PDR  2020  314.1  0.0  0.0  314.1  251.2  62.8 
Lao PDR  2021  342.8  0.0  0.0  342.8  274.3  68.6 
Lao PDR  2022  369.4  0.0  0.0  369.4  295.5  73.9 
Lao PDR  2023  393.7  0.0  0.0  393.7  315.0  78.7 
Lao PDR  2024  415.8  0.0  0.0  415.8  332.6  83.2 
Lao PDR  2025  435.6  0.0  0.0  435.6  348.5  87.1 
Lao PDR  2026  453.2  0.0  0.0  453.2  362.6  90.6 
Lao PDR  2027  468.6  0.0  0.0  468.6  374.9  93.7 
Lao PDR  2028  481.7  0.0  0.0  481.7  385.4  96.3 
Lao PDR  2029  492.6  0.0  0.0  492.6  394.1  98.5 
Lao PDR  2030  501.3  0.0  0.0  501.3  401.0  100.3 
Lao PDR  2031  507.7  0.0  0.0  507.7  406.2  101.5 
Lao PDR  2032  511.9  0.0  0.0  511.9  409.5  102.4 
Lao PDR  2033  513.9  0.0  0.0  513.9  411.1  102.8 
Lao PDR  2034  513.6  0.0  0.0  513.6  410.9  102.7 
Lao PDR  2035  511.1  0.0  0.0  511.1  408.9  102.2 
Lao PDR  2036  506.3  0.0  0.0  506.3  405.1  101.3 
Lao PDR  2037  499.3  0.0  0.0  499.3  399.5  99.9 
Lao PDR  2038  490.1  0.0  0.0  490.1  392.1  98.0 
Lao PDR  2039  478.7  0.0  0.0  478.7  382.9  95.7 
Lao PDR  2040  465.0  0.0  0.0  465.0  372.0  93.0 
Lao PDR  2041  449.0  0.0  0.0  449.0  359.2  89.8 
Lao PDR  2042  430.9  0.0  0.0  430.9  344.7  86.2 
Lao PDR  2043  410.5  0.0  0.0  410.5  328.4  82.1 
Lao PDR  2044  387.8  0.0  0.0  387.8  310.3  77.6 
Lao PDR  2045  363.0  0.0  0.0  363.0  290.4  72.6 
Lao PDR  2046  335.9  0.0  0.0  335.9  268.7  67.2 
Lao PDR  2047  306.5  0.0  0.0  306.5  245.2  61.3 
Lao PDR  2048  274.9  0.0  0.0  274.9  219.9  55.0  
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Lao PDR  2049  241.1  0.0  0.0  241.1  192.9  48.2 
Lao PDR  2050  205.1  0.0  0.0  205.1  164.0  41.0 
Lao PDR  2051  166.8  0.0  0.0  166.8  133.4  33.4 
Lao PDR  2052  126.3  0.0  0.0  126.3  101.0  25.3 
Lao PDR  2053  83.5  0.0  0.0  83.5  66.8  16.7 
Lao PDR  2054  38.5  0.0  0.0  38.5  30.8  7.7 
Lao PDR  2055  2.3  0.0  0.0  2.3  1.9  0.5 
Lao PDR  2056  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
               
Malaysia  2007  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Malaysia  2008  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Malaysia  2009  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Malaysia  2010  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Malaysia  2011  0.0  0.0  111.0  111.0  88.8  22.2 
Malaysia  2012  0.0  0.0  111.0  111.0  88.8  22.2 
Malaysia  2013  0.0  0.0  111.0  111.0  88.8  22.2 
Malaysia  2014  0.0  1.4  111.0  112.4  89.9  22.5 
Malaysia  2015  0.0  28.1  111.0  139.1  111.3  27.8 
Malaysia  2016  0.0  99.0  111.0  210.0  168.0  42.0 
Malaysia  2017  0.0  214.6  111.0  325.6  260.5  65.1 
Malaysia  2018  0.0  340.2  0.0  340.2  272.2  68.0 
Malaysia  2019  0.0  406.5  0.0  406.5  325.2  81.3 
Malaysia  2020  0.0  406.5  0.0  406.5  325.2  81.3 
Malaysia  2021  0.0  340.2  0.0  340.2  272.2  68.0 
Malaysia  2022  0.0  207.7  0.0  207.7  166.1  41.5 
Malaysia  2023  0.0  33.4  0.0  33.4  26.7  6.7 
Malaysia  2024  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
               
Myanmar  2008  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Myanmar  2009  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Myanmar  2010  0.0  0.0  4.8  4.8  3.9  1.0 
Myanmar  2011  0.0  0.0  73.2  73.2  58.6  14.6 
Myanmar  2012  0.0  0.0  73.2  73.2  58.6  14.6 
Myanmar  2013  0.0  0.0  73.2  73.2  58.6  14.6 
Myanmar  2014  0.0  0.0  73.2  73.2  58.6  14.6 
Myanmar  2015  0.0  0.0  73.2  73.2  58.6  14.6 
Myanmar  2016  3.1  0.0  73.2  76.3  61.1  15.3 
Myanmar  2017  49.0  10.4  73.2  132.6  106.0  26.5 
Myanmar  2018  140.7  49.0  0.0  189.7  151.8  37.9 
Myanmar  2019  233.0  78.9  0.0  311.9  249.5  62.4 
Myanmar  2020  321.2  95.5  0.0  416.7  333.4  83.3 
Myanmar  2021  405.4  98.8  0.0  504.2  403.4  100.8 
Myanmar  2022  485.5  88.9  0.0  574.3  459.5  114.9 
Myanmar  2023  561.5  65.6  0.0  627.1  501.7  125.4 
Myanmar  2024  633.5  29.0  0.0  662.5  530.0  132.5 
Myanmar  2025  701.4  0.0  0.0  701.4  561.1  140.3  
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Myanmar  2026  765.3  0.0  0.0  765.3  612.2  153.1 
Myanmar  2027  825.1  0.0  0.0  825.1  660.1  165.0 
Myanmar  2028  880.9  0.0  0.0  880.9  704.7  176.2 
Myanmar  2029  932.6  0.0  0.0  932.6  746.0  186.5 
Myanmar  2030  980.2  0.0  0.0  980.2  784.2  196.0 
Myanmar  2031  1,023.8  0.0  0.0  1,023.8  819.0  204.8 
Myanmar  2032  1,063.3  0.0  0.0  1,063.3  850.7  212.7 
Myanmar  2033  1,098.8  0.0  0.0  1,098.8  879.1  219.8 
Myanmar  2034  1,130.3  0.0  0.0  1,130.3  904.2  226.1 
Myanmar  2035  1,157.6  0.0  0.0  1,157.6  926.1  231.5 
Myanmar  2036  1,181.0  0.0  0.0  1,181.0  944.8  236.2 
Myanmar  2037  1,200.2  0.0  0.0  1,200.2  960.2  240.0 
Myanmar  2038  1,215.4  0.0  0.0  1,215.4  972.3  243.1 
Myanmar  2039  1,226.6  0.0  0.0  1,226.6  981.3  245.3 
Myanmar  2040  1,233.7  0.0  0.0  1,233.7  986.9  246.7 
Myanmar  2041  1,236.7  0.0  0.0  1,236.7  989.4  247.3 
Myanmar  2042  1,235.7  0.0  0.0  1,235.7  988.6  247.1 
Myanmar  2043  1,230.6  0.0  0.0  1,230.6  984.5  246.1 
Myanmar  2044  1,221.5  0.0  0.0  1,221.5  977.2  244.3 
Myanmar  2045  1,208.3  0.0  0.0  1,208.3  966.7  241.7 
Myanmar  2046  1,191.1  0.0  0.0  1,191.1  952.9  238.2 
Myanmar  2047  1,169.8  0.0  0.0  1,169.8  935.8  234.0 
Myanmar  2048  1,144.5  0.0  0.0  1,144.5  915.6  228.9 
Myanmar  2049  1,115.1  0.0  0.0  1,115.1  892.0  223.0 
Myanmar  2050  1,081.6  0.0  0.0  1,081.6  865.3  216.3 
Myanmar  2051  1,044.1  0.0  0.0  1,044.1  835.3  208.8 
Myanmar  2052  1,002.5  0.0  0.0  1,002.5  802.0  200.5 
Myanmar  2053  956.9  0.0  0.0  956.9  765.5  191.4 
Myanmar  2054  907.2  0.0  0.0  907.2  725.8  181.4 
Myanmar  2055  853.5  0.0  0.0  853.5  682.8  170.7 
Myanmar  2056  795.7  0.0  0.0  795.7  636.6  159.1 
Myanmar  2057  733.8  0.0  0.0  733.8  587.1  146.8 
Myanmar  2058  667.9  0.0  0.0  667.9  534.4  133.6 
Myanmar  2059  598.0  0.0  0.0  598.0  478.4  119.6 
Myanmar  2060  524.0  0.0  0.0  524.0  419.2  104.8 
Myanmar  2061  445.9  0.0  0.0  445.9  356.7  89.2 
Myanmar  2062  363.8  0.0  0.0  363.8  291.0  72.8 
Myanmar  2063  277.6  0.0  0.0  277.6  222.1  55.5 
Myanmar  2064  187.4  0.0  0.0  187.4  149.9  37.5 
Myanmar  2065  93.1  0.0  0.0  93.1  74.5  18.6 
Myanmar  2066  9.9  0.0  0.0  9.9  7.9  2.0 
Myanmar  2067  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
 
Thailand  2008  0.0  0.0  0.5  0.5  0.4  0.1 
Thailand  2009  0.0  0.6  1.8  2.4  2.0  0.5 
Thailand  2010  0.0  1.1  0.0  1.1  0.9  0.2  
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Thailand  2011  0.0  0.0  0.9  0.9  0.7  0.2 
Thailand  2012  0.0  0.0  0.9  0.9  0.7  0.2 
Thailand  2013  0.0  0.0  0.9  0.9  0.7  0.2 
Thailand  2014  0.0  0.0  0.9  0.9  0.7  0.2 
Thailand  2015  0.0  0.0  0.9  0.9  0.7  0.2 
Thailand  2016  0.0  0.0  0.9  0.9  0.7  0.2 
Thailand  2017  0.0  0.0  0.9  0.9  0.7  0.2 
Thailand  2018  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
 
Vietnam  2008  4.5  4.3  0.4  9.1  7.3  1.8 
Vietnam  2009  11.0  9.9  1.5  22.5  18.0  4.5 
Vietnam  2010  13.7  10.9  0.0  24.6  19.6  4.9 
Vietnam  2011  9.6  4.5  2.7  16.8  13.4  3.4 
Vietnam  2012  6.3  0.1  2.7  9.1  7.3  1.8 
Vietnam  2013  4.5  0.0  2.7  7.2  5.7  1.4 
Vietnam  2014  4.2  0.0  2.7  6.9  5.5  1.4 
Vietnam  2015  5.4  0.0  2.7  8.1  6.4  1.6 
Vietnam  2016  8.1  0.0  2.7  10.7  8.6  2.1 
Vietnam  2017  12.3  0.0  2.7  14.9  11.9  3.0 
Vietnam  2018  17.1  0.0  0.0  17.1  13.7  3.4 
Vietnam  2019  20.9  0.0  0.0  20.9  16.8  4.2 
Vietnam  2020  23.6  0.0  0.0  23.6  18.9  4.7 
Vietnam  2021  25.1  0.0  0.0  25.1  20.1  5.0 
Vietnam  2022  25.4  0.0  0.0  25.4  20.3  5.1 
Vietnam  2023  24.5  0.0  0.0  24.5  19.6  4.9 
Vietnam  2024  22.4  0.0  0.0  22.4  17.9  4.5 
Vietnam  2025  19.2  0.0  0.0  19.2  15.3  3.8 
Vietnam  2026  14.7  0.0  0.0  14.7  11.8  2.9 
Vietnam  2027  9.1  0.0  0.0  9.1  7.3  1.8 
Vietnam  2028  2.5  0.0  0.0  2.5  2.0  0.5 
Vietnam  2029  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
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2008  12.3  13.2  147.4  172.9  138.3  34.6 
2009  84.9  47.5  178.0  310.4  248.3  62.1 
2010  79.3  48.4  8.0  135.7  108.5  27.1 
2011  79.3  41.9  374.3  495.5  396.4  99.1 
2012  169.9  35.4  374.3  579.6  463.7  115.9 
2013  356.1  31.0  374.3  761.4  609.1  152.3 
2014  638.8  28.4  374.3  1,041.5  833.2  208.3 
2015  1,021.7  54.2  374.3  1,450.2  1,160.1  290.0 
2016  1,508.5  124.8  374.3  2,007.6  1,606.1  401.5 
2017  2,138.9  252.2  374.3  2,765.4  2,212.3  553.1 
2018  2,859.6  416.0  0.0  3,275.6  2,620.5  655.1 
2019  3,512.5  506.3  0.0  4,018.8  3,215.0  803.8 
2020  4,081.8  523.4  0.0  4,605.2  3,684.2  921.0 
2021  4,567.5  459.0  0.0  5,026.4  4,021.2  1,005.3 
2022  4,969.5  311.9  0.0  5,281.4  4,225.1  1,056.3 
2023  5,287.9  106.9  0.0  5,394.8  4,315.8  1,079.0 
2024  5,522.7  29.5  0.0  5,552.2  4,441.7  1,110.4 
2025  5,673.8  0.0  0.0  5,673.8  4,539.1  1,134.8 
2026  5,741.3  0.0  0.0  5,741.3  4,593.1  1,148.3 
2027  5,725.2  0.0  0.0  5,725.2  4,580.2  1,145.0 
2028  5,625.6  0.0  0.0  5,625.6  4,500.5  1,125.1 
2029  5,447.7  0.0  0.0  5,447.7  4,358.2  1,089.5 
2030  5,189.8  0.0  0.0  5,189.8  4,151.9  1,038.0 
2031  4,849.5  0.0  0.0  4,849.5  3,879.6  969.9 
2032  4,426.7  0.0  0.0  4,426.7  3,541.4  885.3 
2033  3,921.5  0.0  0.0  3,921.5  3,137.2  784.3 
2034  3,333.9  0.0  0.0  3,333.9  2,667.1  666.8 
2035  2,663.7  0.0  0.0  2,663.7  2,131.0  532.7 
2036  1,991.3  0.0  0.0  1,991.3  1,593.0  398.3 
2037  1,878.0  0.0  0.0  1,878.0  1,502.4  375.6 
2038  1,878.5  0.0  0.0  1,878.5  1,502.8  375.7 
2039  1,871.5  0.0  0.0  1,871.5  1,497.2  374.3 
2040  1,856.9  0.0  0.0  1,856.9  1,485.5  371.4 
2041  1,834.8  0.0  0.0  1,834.8  1,467.9  367.0 
2042  1,805.2  0.0  0.0  1,805.2  1,444.2  361.0 
2043  1,768.1  0.0  0.0  1,768.1  1,414.5  353.6 
2044  1,723.5  0.0  0.0  1,723.5  1,378.8  344.7 
2045  1,671.4  0.0  0.0  1,671.4  1,337.1  334.3 
2046  1,611.7  0.0  0.0  1,611.7  1,289.4  322.3  
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2047  1,544.5  0.0  0.0  1,544.5  1,235.6  308.9 
2048  1,469.8  0.0  0.0  1,469.8  1,175.9  294.0 
2049  1,387.6  0.0  0.0  1,387.6  1,110.1  277.5 
2050  1,297.9  0.0  0.0  1,297.9  1,038.3  259.6 
2051  1,210.9  0.0  0.0  1,210.9  968.7  242.2 
2052  1,128.8  0.0  0.0  1,128.8  903.0  225.8 
2053  1,040.4  0.0  0.0  1,040.4  832.3  208.1 
2054  945.7  0.0  0.0  945.7  756.6  189.1 
2055  855.8  0.0  0.0  855.8  684.6  171.2 
2056  795.7  0.0  0.0  795.7  636.6  159.1 
2057  733.8  0.0  0.0  733.8  587.1  146.8 
2058  667.9  0.0  0.0  667.9  534.4  133.6 
2059  598.0  0.0  0.0  598.0  478.4  119.6 
2060  524.0  0.0  0.0  524.0  419.2  104.8 
2061  445.9  0.0  0.0  445.9  356.7  89.2 
2062  363.8  0.0  0.0  363.8  291.0  72.8 
2063  277.6  0.0  0.0  277.6  222.1  55.5 
2064  187.4  0.0  0.0  187.4  149.9  37.5 
2065  93.1  0.0  0.0  93.1  74.5  18.6 
2066  9.9  0.0  0.0  9.9  7.9  2.0 
2067  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  
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Appendix A4  
FORMA Methodology  
FORMA utilizes data recorded daily by the Moderate Resolution Imaging Spectrometer 
(MODIS), which operates on NASA's Terra and Aqua (EOS PM) satellite platforms. 
Although its signal-processing algorithms are relatively complex, FORMA is based on a 
common-sense observation: Tropical forest-clearing involves the burning of biomass and a 
pronounced temporary or long-term change in vegetation color, as the original forest is 
cleared and replaced by pastures, croplands or plantations. Accordingly, FORMA constructs 
forest-clearing indicators from MODIS-derived data on the incidence of fires and changes in 
vegetation color as identified by the Normalized Difference Vegetation Index (NDVI). It 
then calibrates to local forest-clearing by fitting a statistical model that relates the MODIS-
based indicator values to the best available information on actual forest-clearing in each area. 
FORMA incorporates local diversity by dividing each country into WWF ecoregions and 
separately fitting the model to data for each ecoregion. The dependent variable for each pixel 
is coded 1 if it has experienced forest-clearing within the relevant time period, and 0 
otherwise. The MODIS-based indicator values are the independent variables.  
For all tropical countries except Brazil, the best identification of recent forest clearing has 
been published in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences by Hansen, et al.13 
(2008), who estimate the incidence of forest-clearing for 500m parcels in the humid tropics. 
We calibrate FORMA using the map of forest cover loss hotspots (henceforth referred to as 
the FCLH dataset) published by Hansen, et al. for the period 2000-2005.14  
Using the FCLH pan-tropical dataset for 2000-2005, FORMA fits the calibration model to 
observations on forest-clearing for 1 km2 cells in each country and ecoregion. As we 
document in Hammer, et al. (2009), the model’s predicted probability distribution provides a 
very close match to the spatial incidence of FCLH forest-clearing. FORMA then applies the 
fitted model to monthly MODIS indicator data for the period after December 2005. The 
output for each month is a predicted forest-clearing probability for each 1 km2 parcel outside 
of previously-deforested areas, as identified in the FCLH map. FORMA selects parcels 
whose probabilities exceed 50%. We calculate the total number of selected parcels within a 
geographic area to produce an index of forest-clearing activity in that area. Even small 
                                                       
13  Hansen, M.C., Stehman, S.V., Potapov, P.V., Loveland, T.R., Townshend, J.R.G., DeFries, R.S., Pittman, 
K.W., Stolle, F., Steininger, M.K., Carroll, M., Dimiceli, C. 2008. Humid tropical forest clearing from 2000 to 
2005 quantified using multi-temporal and multi-resolution remotely sensed data. PNAS, 105(27), 9439-9444. 
www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.0804042105 
14  In Brazil, higher resolution estimates are also available annually from the INPE PRODES program.  We 
have used these estimates to test the accuracy of our FCLH-based calibration methodology.  For more 




geographic areas can include thousands of 1 km cells, so error-averaging ensures robust 




                                                       
15  For example, a square area 50 km on a side contains 2,500 1 km cells. 